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Imagining	counterfactual	history,	surely	it	would	have	been	better	if	there	had	been	a	 1954	 item	 by	Musgrave	 and	 Samuelson	 that	 led	 to	 a	 post-1970	 Nobel	 Prize	 in	economics.	Indeed,	many	discerning	academics	believe	that	Stockholm	erred	in	not	honoring	the	author	of	Musgrave’s	Theory	of	Public	Finance.		(Samuelson	2008)	This	paper	is	on	the	history	of	the	concept	of	Public	Goods,	which	came	to	maturity	in	the	New	American	public	finance,	roughly	from	the	1930s	to	the	end	of	the	1960s.	It	focuses	on	Richard	A.	Musgrave’s	contribution,	which	has	been	overshadowed	by	Samuelson’s	(1954,	1955)	 brilliant	 formal	 exposition.	 The	 popular	 misconception	 is	 well	 represented	 in	 a	recent	 entry	 on	 free	 riding	 written	 by	 Russell	 Hardin	 in	 the	 Stanford	 Encyclopedia	 of	
Philosophy:	
Olson	 based	 his	 analysis	 on	 Paul	 Samuelson’s	 theory	 of	 public	 goods.	 Samuelson	(1954)	noted	that	some	goods,	once	they	are	made	available	to	one	person,	can	be	consumed	 by	 others	 at	 no	 additional	 marginal	 cost;	 this	 condition	 is	 commonly	called	 jointness	 of	 supply	 or	 nonrivalness	 of	 consumption.	 […]	 There	 is	 a	 second	feature	of	Samuelson’s	public	goods	that	would	make	them	problematic	in	practice:	the	impossibility	of	exclusion.	(Hardin	2003,	8–9)	As	 I	 will	 argue,	 Musgrave’s	 role	 is	 decisive,	 especially	 on	 the	 standard	 textbook	definition	that	Hardin	referred	to.	Pure	public	goods	are	commonly	defined	in	textbooks	as	being	neither	rival	nor	excludable.	Musgrave	(1969a)	was	the	first	to	use	this	two-criteria	definition.	
This	 definition	 is	 used	 in	 public	 economics	 textbooks	 (Cornes	 and	 Sandler	 1996;	Hindriks	and	Myles	2006;	Gruber	2011),	as	well	as	 in	microeconomics	 textbooks	(Varian	1992;	Nicholson	and	Snyder	2011).	None	of	the	aforementioned	authoritative	texts	refer	to	Musgrave	on	the	topic	of	public	goods,	but	they	all	refer	to	Samuelson.	Furthermore,	most	of	 them	 make	 use	 of	 a	 2x2	 table	 in	 order	 to	 classify	 four	 different	 families	 of	 goods	according	to	the	possibility	of	excluding	consumers	from	their	benefits,	and	whether	they	are	 intrinsically	 rival	 (see	 Table	1).	 This	 pedagogical	 device	 was	 first	 conceived	 by	
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Musgrave	and	Musgrave	(1973),	although	no	reference	 to	 its	origin	 is	 to	be	 found	 in	any	textbook.2	
Although	a	few	scholars—those	who	knew	Musgrave	personally,	or	who	studied	his	work	 closely—recognized	 his	 contribution,	 no	 systematic	 and	 retrospective	 analysis	 of	Musgrave’s	 role	 in	 defining	 public	 goods	 has	 been	 made.3	 Motivated	 by	 Samuelson’s	remark,	the	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	fill	the	gap	described	above	in	the	history	of	the	theory	of	public	goods,	by	appraising	Richard	A.	Musgrave’s	contribution.	I	argue	that	the	concept	of	public	goods	illustrates	Musgrave’s	intention	to	justify	his	view	of	the	role	of	the	state	in	providing	goods	and	services	to	the	citizens	with	an	argument	that	would	be	acceptable	to	the	community	of	American	economists	in	the	middle	of	the	twentieth	century.	Samuelson	played	a	decisive	role	in	the	evolution	of	the	conceptualization	of	public	expenditures,	yet	Musgrave's	 two-criteria	 definition	 reflects	 his	 life-long	 concern	 for	 a	 comprehensive,	realistic,	 and	 useful	 normative	 theory	 of	 the	 public	 sector.	 Moreover,	 the	 evolution	 of	Musgrave’s	 writings	 on	 public	 goods	 exemplifies	 the	 refining	 of	 a	 theoretical	 question	through	exchanges	with	colleagues,	in	particular	Samuelson.	
1.	Musgrave	before	Samuelson	
1.1.	Musgrave’s	early	synthesis	Born	 in	 Königstein	 in	 1910	 to	 a	 family	 of	 German	 intellectuals,	Musgrave	 studied	 at	 the	University	 of	Munich	 and	 at	 the	University	 of	Heidelberg,	where	 he	 obtained	 his	Diplom																																																									2	On	economists’	strategic	moves	 for	recognition	and	the	historiographic	challenges	of	attributing	credit	to	scientific	discoveries	in	postwar	economics,	see	Düppe	and	Weintraub	(2014,	pp.	xvi;	233).	To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 two-criteria	 definition	 given	 by	 Musgrave	 is	 used	 mostly	 in	 lower-level	textbook	literature,	the	lack	of	credit	is	perhaps	less	surprising	(see	Medema	2012).		3	See	for	instance,	Atkinson	(1987),	Seidl	(1988),	Pickhardt	(2006),	Oates	(2007).	
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Volkswirt	degree	in	1933	(Musgrave	1986,	1997;	Sinn	2009).	Through	the	teaching	of	Adolf	Weber,	 Otto	 von	 Zwiedineck,	 Alfred	 Weber,	 Jakob	 Marschak,	 and	 Otto	 Pfleiderer,	 he	became	 acquainted	 with	 European	 scholarship	 on	 public	 finance,	 economics,	 law,	 and	sociology.	 He	 then	 moved	 to	 the	 US	 in	 1933	 on	 a	 one-year	 scholarship	 to	 study	 at	 the	University	 of	 Rochester,	 but,	 with	 the	 turn	 of	 events	 in	 Germany,	 decided	 to	 stay.	 As	 a	result,	he	became	part	of	a	generation	of	German-speaking	scholars	who	had	emigrated	to	the	United	States	and	contributed	to	the	internationalization	of	economics	in	an	American	synthesis	(Craver	and	Leijonhufvud	1987;	Hagemann	2011).	
Musgrave’s	 “comparative	 advantage”	 lay	 in	 his	 acquaintance	 with	 continental	literature	on	public	finance	(Musgrave	1992,	1997).4	Musgrave’s	unpublished	dissertation	on	The	Theory	of	Public	Finance	and	the	Concept	of	Burden	of	Taxation	(1937)	drew	heavily	on	this	literature.	He	tried	to	synthesize	different	theoretical	works	on	public	expenditures	and	on	 taxation	 from	the	end	of	 the	nineteenth	century	 to	 the	 first	part	of	 the	 twentieth.	From	 a	 traditionally	 narrow	 focus	 on	 “the	 burden	 of	 taxation”,	 Musgrave	 enlarges	 the	research	 agenda	 of	 Public	 finance	 to	 the	 net	 effect	 of	 the	 government	 revenues	 and	expenditures	processes.	He	thus	clearly	sets	his	research	within	the	framework	of	welfare	economics,	 but	with	 consideration	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 state’s	 economic	 activities.	 This	reorientation	 is	 justified	 by	 the	 increasing	 importance	 of	 public	 expenditures	 (Musgrave	1937,	20–21).	 In	the	midst	of	the	New	Deal,	government	spending	had	become	a	burning	
																																																								
4	When	Musgrave	arrived	 in	 the	United	States	 in	1933,	public	 finance	was	a	 subfield	 that	had	 coalesced	around	progressive	economists	 at	Wisconsin	and	at	Columbia.	Yet	 the	 influence	of	American	 progressives	 was	 fading	 in	 the	 early	 1930s,	 as	 Pigou	 (1928)	 became	 the	 leading	 text	(Johnson	2014,	2015a).		
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question	as	 “economics	had	moved	to	 the	 forefront	of	politics”	 (Musgrave	1997,	65)	(see	also	Johnson	2015c).		
Regarding	the	question	of	the	assessment	of	the	benefits	of	the	services	provided	by	the	 Public	 Economy,	 Musgrave	 rejects	 the	 Italian	 subjectivist	 assumption:	 “the	 basic	assumption	 of	 individual	 evaluation	 of	 collective	 wants,	 considering	 the	 latter	 as	homogeneous	with	individual	wants	proper,	appears	unrealistic”	(Musgrave	1937,	38).5	Yet	Musgrave	also	rejects	the	opposite	perspective	which	assumes	that	the	state	is	the	subject	of	organic	wants	(ibid.,	49).	Furthermore,	on	the	subject	of	the	science	of	public	finance,	he	remarks:	 “political	 decisions	 are	 formulated	 as	 being	 so	 complex	 that	 no	 attempt	 to	rationalize	the	latter	in	terms	of	individual	evaluation	can	be	undertaken	without	extensive	sociological	 analysis	 of	 the	 prevailing	 institutional	 set-up”	 (ibid.,	 40).6	 He	 considers	 a	National	 Economy	as	 a	 system	 that	 comprises	 two	 legitimate	 spheres—Market	Economy	and	 Public	 Economy—in	 an	 interrelationship,	 and	 both	 drawing	 from	 the	 same	 pool	 of	resources.	 The	 Public	 Economy	 seen	 as	 planned	 household	 has	 its	 own	 logic.	 Carving	 a	middle-of-the-road	position	 typical	of	 the	1930s,	Musgrave	did	not	see	 the	market	as	 the	baseline	 for	 all	 economic	 life,	 and	 neither	 was	 it	 for	 the	 study	 of	 public	 finance.	 As	Musgrave	 (1937,	 73)	 puts	 it:	 “The	 interpretation	 of	 Public	 Economy	 as	 planned	 or	
																																																								5	 In	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	 his	 dissertation,	 Musgrave	 reviews	 the	 three	 main	 traditions	 in	 public	finance	on	their	view	of	the	public	economy:	the	classical	British	tradition,	the	German	triad	(L.	von	Stein,	A.	E.	Schäffle,	and	Adolf	Wagner),	and	what	he	labels	the	Exchange	economy	perspective	(E.	Sax,	K.	Wicksell,	and	E.	Lindahl).	Through	the	latter	German-writing	authors,	he	also	discusses	their	Italian	predecessors,	namely	A.	Di	Viti	de	Marco	and	Ugo	Mazzola.	
6	 Both	 subjectivist	 assumptions	were	 important	 for	 Italian	 scholars	 like	De	Viti	 de	Marco	 (1934)	and	Mazzola	 (1890).	 They	 adapted	 the	 analytical	 apparatus	 of	 the	marginalist	 theory	 of	 value	 to	public	expenditures	The	state	is	thus	conceived	as	an	aggregation	of	individuals	who	(voluntarily)	pay	taxes	in	exchange	of	services.	Moreover,	they	assumed	that	individuals	are	able	to	directly	feel	and	assess	the	benefits	of	the	public	goods.	
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household	 economy	 is	 in	 closer	 agreement	 with	 actual	 institutions	 than	 the	 other	explanation	in	terms	of	market	exchange;	consequently	the	former	approach	offers	a	better	tool	for	the	comparison	of	actual	conditions	with	the	theoretical	model.”		
Just	 as	 the	 economist	 usually	 assumes	 that	 the	 consumer	 has	 given	 preferences,	Musgrave	 assumes	 that	 the	 subject	 of	 public	 finance	 (the	 budget	 planner)	works	 on	 the	basis	of	a	given	schedule	of	social	wants.	In	the	1950s,	following	Samuelson’s	(1947)	work	inspired	 by	 Bergson	 (1938),	 Musgrave	 substituted	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 social	 welfare	function	 for	 his	 earlier	 expression	 of	 a	 schedule	 of	 social	wants.	 This	 assumption	 partly	explains	why,	in	his	dissertation,	Musgrave	is	not	yet	trying	to	identify	specific	criteria	for	public	expenditures.	In	a	Wagnerian	fashion,	he	merely	indicates	that	the	actual	collective	wants	 and	 socially	 interpreted	 individual	 wants	 satisfied	 by	 publicly	 provided	 goods	depend	on	historical,	political	and	social	factors.	In	the	end,	Musgrave	wants	to	assess	the	welfare	 ‘net	 effect’	 of	 the	 public	 economy,	 but	 he	 acknowledges	 that	 his	 accounting	procedure	runs	into	difficulties	in	assessing	the	benefits	of	public	expenditures	(Musgrave	1937,	121).	Like	many	before	him,	Musgrave	argued	that	some	public	expenditures	satisfy	collective	wants	 that	 cannot	 be	 easily	 traced	 to	 individual	 needs	 due	 to	 their	 indivisible	nature.7	Musgrave	calls	 them	 ‘social	wants	proper’	 (ibid.,	120,	335).8	This	 issue	 is	neither	
																																																								
7	This	 is	distinguished	 from	 the	other	problem	of	 indivisibility	due	 to	 the	 “bulky”	nature	of	 some	goods	 (ibid.,	395).	Musgrave	does	not	 really	discuss	 this	 case,	but	one	 can	understand	something	like	a	problem	of	 ‘joint	supply’,	or	 ‘indivisibility’	on	the	supply	side,	which	has	to	be	distinguished	from	 the	 problem	 of	 indivisibility	 on	 the	 consumption	 side.	 Similar	 ideas	 are	 stated	 by	Wagner	(1892,	275	ff.)	and	Smith	(1776	V.i,	723).	
8	The	idiom	is	likely	adapted	from	Sax’s	(1924)	expression	of	“collective	wants	proper”	(eigentlichen	
Kollektivbedürfnisse).	For	earlier	statements	of	the	idea	of	indivisibility,	see	De	Viti	de	Marco	(1934,	80),	Sax	(1924),	Wagner	(1892,	275,	419);	Leroy-Beaulieu	(1906,	175)	and	Seligman	(1908).	All	of	
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the	 central	 nor	 the	 most	 original	 aspect	 of	 Musgrave’s	 dissertation,	 however,	 it	 is	 very	important	for	the	discussions	that	will	follow	on	the	specificity	of	public	goods.	Musgrave	assumes	there	exists	 individual	wants,	and	collective	wants	proper.	Most	of	the	first	ones	are	 satisfied	 within	 the	 market	 economy,	 but	 the	 public	 economy	 may	 satisfy	 both	collective	 wants	 proper	 and	 “socially	 interpreted	 individual	 wants”	 (ibid.,	335).	 This	conceptualization	clearly	anticipates	the	function	of	the	Allocation	branch	in	the	Theory	of	
Public	Finance	(1959)	which	is	to	provide	goods	to	satisfy	public	wants	of	two	kinds:	social	wants	 and	 merit	 wants.9	 By	 highlighting	 its	 productive	 capacity,	 its	 role	 in	 providing	necessity	 goods,	 and	 its	 lawful	 ability	 to	 interfere	 with	 individual	 wants	 satisfaction,	 a	relatively	positive	view	of	the	state	emerges	from	Musgrave’s	early	work.	
1.2.	Free	riding	and	non-exclusion	In	1939,	 two	years	after	defending	his	PhD	thesis	at	Harvard,	Musgrave’s	 first	paper	was	published	 in	 the	Quarterly	 Journal	of	Economics	while	he	was	serving	as	 instructor	 in	 the	Harvard's	economics	department.	Based	on	his	dissertation,	the	paper	is	a	reconstruction	of	 the	 voluntary	 exchange	 theory	 of	 public	 economy	 as	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Sax,	 De	 Viti	 De	Marco,	Wicksell,	 and,	 in	 a	more	mature	 form,	 in	 Lindahl.	 From	 their	 perspective,	 “taxes	accordingly	 appear	 as	 voluntary	 payments	 rendered	 by	 the	 individual	 in	 exchange	 for	services	 supplied	 by	 public	 economy,	 and	 in	 accordance	 with	 his	 evaluation	 of	 those	services”	 (Musgrave	 1939,	 214).	 The	 young	 Musgrave,	 put	 forward	 many	 arguments																																																																																																																																																																																			these	 works	 are	 referred	 to	 by	 Musgrave	 (1937).	 Colm	 (1934,	 325)	 also	 makes	 a	 similar	observation.	See	also	Sturn	(2006).	
9	Merit	wants	are	human	needs	of	such	importance	for	the	community	that	their	satisfaction	cannot	be	left	to	the	market,	even	if	the	goods	which	satisfy	them	do	not	suffer	from	non-exclusion	or	non-rivalry	problem.	The	first	examples	of	merit	goods	given	by	Musgrave	are	transfers	in	kind	like	housing	for	the	poor,	school	lunches	and	healthcare	services.	See,	Desmarais-Tremblay	(Forthcoming).	
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against	the	voluntary	approach—but	his	main	contention	is	the	“highly	unrealistic”	nature	of	a	model	 that	 relies	on	 the	hypothesis	of	voluntary	exchange.	He	writes:	 “The	very	 fact	that	 such	 enforcement	 appears	 universally	 necessary	 indicates	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 general	willingness	 to	 comply	with	 the	obligation	 to	 contribute”	 (ibid.,	 219).	Musgrave	 comes	up	with	a	behavioral	rationale	to	explain	this	“fact”.	What	will	eventually	become	the	standard	argument	for	public	good	provision	is	found	in	a	long	footnote:	
We	note	the	theoretical	difficulty	which	arises	for	the	voluntary	exchange	theory	in	the	 event	 that	 some	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 community	 should	 attempt	 to	 benefit	from	 public	 services	without	 in	 turn	 being	 eager	 to	 contribute	 their	 share.	While	recognized	as	 constituting	a	 ‘pathological	 group’	 (De	Marco,	 [1934],	p.	114)	and	a	‘problem’	(Benham	[1934],	p.	454),	they	are	ruled	out	by	the	assumption	of	purely	voluntary	action.	Assuming,	however,	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	all	people	act	in	the	prescribed	‘pathological’	manner,	the	following	problem	arises:	if	the	total	cost	of	public	services	 is	covered	by	a	 large	number	of	contributors,	a	reduction	 in	 the	contribution	 of	 any	 one	 contributor	 will	 fail	 to	 affect	 notably	 the	 total	 supply	 of	public	services	–	either	from	the	point	of	view	of	this	contributor	or	in	the	eyes	of	other	 contributors	 who	 join	 in	 the	 consumption	 of	 the	 same	 indivisible	 services.	Hence	 the	 reduction	 will	 result	 in	 a	 gain	 for	 the	 contributor	 in	 question	 without	leading	 to	 reprisals.	 If	 all	 contributors	 should	 accordingly	 decide	 to	 reduce	 their	contributions,	 the	 volume	 of	 public	 services	 will	 tend	 to	 shrink,	 and	 an	 unstable	situation	will	result.	(Musgrave	1939,	219–20,	n.5)	One	 finds	here	 the	 first	 clear	exposition	 in	English	of	what	would	 later	be	called	 the	 free	
riding	 hypothesis.10	 It	 derives	 from	 the	 situation	 where	 a	 large	 number	 of	 individuals	contribute	to	a	collective	good	or	service.	Because	of	this	large	number	of	contributors	and	the	 fact	 that	 they	all	benefit	collectively	 from	the	service,	one	 individual	could	reduce	his	contribution	(if	he	were	not	forced	to	pay	for	it)	without	the	others	noticing.	This	individual	would	then	be	free	riding—benefiting	from	the	service	without	actually	paying	for	it.	Yet,	if																																																									
10	For	forerunners	of	this	reasoning,	see	Sax	(1924,	212),	De	Viti	de	Marco	(1934,	113–14),	Benham	(1934,	 452–54),	 and	Wicksell	 (1896,	 81–82).	 The	more	 general	 idea	 that	 the	 state	 is	 justified	 to	intervene	to	prevent	non-cooperative	behavior	in	certain	contexts	is	already	found,	for	instance,	in	Hume,	Smith	and	Sidgwick.	See	Medema	(2009).		
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many	act	like	him,	the	aggregate	level	of	contribution	would	fall	and	the	service	could	not	be	 properly	 funded.	 Musgrave’s	 argument	 achieved	 what	 was	 probably	 an	 unintended	success.	At	the	very	least,	Musgrave	did	not	need	this	argument	to	convince	himself	that	the	state	had	a	positive	role	to	play	in	the	welfare	of	the	citizens	in	a	democratic	society.	This	was	already	assumed	in	the	approach	to	public	economy	he	adopted	in	his	dissertation.	It	is	also	 a	 consequence	of	 the	progressive	narrative	of	Wagner’s	 Law	endorsed	by	Musgrave	throughout	his	life.11	Yet,	this	argument	convinced	some	economists	that	public	provision	of	specific	goods	was	required	(about	which	more	below),	 in	part	because	 it	relied	on	an	assumption	 of	 selfish	 rationality	which	 later	 became	 common	place	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	twentieth	century.	What	eventually	became	the	rational	behavioral	response	could	still	be	considered	a	pathological	case	in	the	1930s	(Pickhardt	2005;	Tuck	2008;	Fontaine	2014).	
This	 convincing	 argument	 had	 the	 paradoxical	 effect	 of	 narrowing	 the	 scope	 of	collective	wants	to	those	which	are	satisfied	by	goods	that	can	provoke	free	riding	behavior	if	 left	 to	 voluntary	 provision.	When	 compared	 to	 the	 broad	 range	 of	 human	motivations	contemplated	 by	 Wagner	 (1892)	 and	 Sax	 (1924),	 among	 others,	 the	 straw	 man	 that	Musgrave	sets	up	in	order	to	attack	voluntary	provision	appears	thin.12	Following	Wicksell,	but	contrary	to	De	Viti	de	Marco	and	Benham,	Musgrave	assumes	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	 everyone	 behaves	 as	 such.	 Still,	 it	 is	 only	 for	 the	 argument,	 since	Musgrave	 did	 not	
																																																								11	 	 Wagner	 (1883;	 1892,	 379)	 perceived	 that	 there	 was	 something	 constitutive	 of	 economic	progress	that	would	lead	to	an	increasing	role	for	the	state.	He	observed	a	relative	(and	absolute)	growth	 in	 public	 expenditures	 in	many	Western	 European	 countries	 and	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 the	result	of	pressures	for	social	progress.	
12	 This	 had	 the	 consequence	 of	 leaving	 out	 of	 the	 public	 good	 category	 many	 government	interventions	that	were	not	justifiable	in	a	selfish	way.	I	argued	elsewhere	that	the	concept	of	merit	goods	was	coined	by	Musgrave	to	capture	those	goods	and	services	(Desmarais-Tremblay	2015).	
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really	 believe	 that	 individuals	 always	 behave	 in	 a	 selfish	 way:	 “The	 hypothesis	 that	 the	motive	of	action	is	purely	egoistic	is	as	unrealistic	as	the	other	assumption	that	it	is	purely	altruistic:	In	reality	political	action	is	motivated	by	both	forces”	(Musgrave	1937,	333).	
Buchanan	(1964)	was	the	first	to	use	the	expression	of	 free	rider	 in	public	finance.	He	later	theorized	it	as	a	specific	case—alongside	perfect	competition—of	a	more	general	“large	 number	 dilemma.”	 Buchanan	 (1964)	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 Musgrave	 (1939),	 but	 he	probably	 had	 read	 the	 paper,	 since	 he	 refers	 to	 it	 in	 “Knut	 Wicksell	 on	 Marginal	 Cost	Pricing”	 (1951).	 It	 is	also	cited	by	Baumol	 (1952)	and	Downs	(1957).	Moreover,	Peacock	(1954)	uses	the	free	riding	argument	as	a	criticism	of	Lindahl’s	model	on	the	same	page	in	which	 he	 cites	 Musgrave	 (1939).	 The	 generalization	 of	 the	 free	 riding	 argument	 to	 all	collective	 action	 was	 made	 by	 Olson	 (1965)	 (Dougherty	 2003).	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	treatise,	 he	makes	explicit	 reference	 to	Musgrave	on	non-exclusion:	 “The	 second	point	 is	that	 once	 the	 relevant	 group	has	been	defined,	 the	definition	used	here,	 like	Musgrave’s,	distinguishes	collective	good	 in	 terms	of	 infeasibility	of	excluding	potential	 consumers	of	the	 good”	 (p.	 14).	 Although	 this	 idea	 could	 have	 come	 to	 him	 from	 Musgrave’s	 Theory	(1959),	he	also	makes	a	reference	to	the	1939	paper.	
By	making	a	caricature	of	its	essential	features,	Musgrave	successfully	attacked	the	voluntary	 exchange	 tradition	 as	 a	 positive	 model	 (Fossati	 2003).	 Yet,	 it	 survived	 as	 a	normative	horizon—that	of	free	individual	exchange—in	Buchanan’s	research	program	on	public	goods	and	more	generally	on	constitutional	political	economy	(Johnson	2015b).		
At	the	end	of	his	first	paper,	Musgrave	alluded	to	a	“planning	approach”	in	place	of	the	voluntary	exchange	model.	Based	on	his	dissertation,	 this	 approach	will	 be	 criticized	
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the	next	year	by	Neal	(1940).	The	latter	contended	that	the	formation	of	a	social	preference	scale	in	which	an	individual	could	compare	the	benefits	he	gets	from	the	protection	of	an	additional	destroyer	to	eating	another	apple	was	not	feasible.	Concluding	that	the	provision	for	 collective	 wants	 must	 then	 be	 arbitrary,	 he	 warned	 against	 such	 “partial	 planning”	which	 would	 “subvert	 the	 democracy”	 since	 individuals	 would	 not	 always	 be	 able	 to	exercise	and	express	their	rational	judgment.	
In	defending	the	requirement	of	compulsion	for	the	public	economy	against	Neal’s	criticism,	 Musgrave	 (1941)	 argued	 that,	 because	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 free	 riding,	 no	unanimous	 vote	 could	 be	 expected	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 collective	 goods.	 Requiring	unanimity	would	lead	to	total	inaction	and	would,	furthermore,	prevent	any	redistributive	policies	 being	 accepted.	 The	 explicit	 argument	 is	 provided	 by	 Musgrave	 in	 a	 footnote:	“[T]he	individual	members	of	the	community	will	attempt	to	minimize	their	contributions,	knowing	that	they	can	not	be	excluded	 [my	emphasis]	from	the	benefits.	Cf.	Musgrave,	op.	cit.,	p.	219,	note	5”	(Musgrave	1941,	320,	n.4).	This	last	remark	in	which	Musgrave	refers	to	the	famous	footnote	of	his	1939	paper	is	the	first	occurrence	in	his	writings	of	the	idea	that	voluntary	 provision	 (i.e.,	 market	 allocation)	 of	 collective	 goods	 will	 fail	 because	 of	 the	impossibility	of	exclusion.	
In	the	same	paper,	Musgrave	formulates	the	core	idea	of	his	normative	approach	to	public	finance	that	was	already	set	forth	in	his	(unpublished)	dissertation:		
I	 am	aware	 that	my	model	offers	no	 realistic	 theory	of	a	descriptive	 sort,	but	 it	 is	realistic	in	the	sense	of	pointing	towards	an	attack	on	the	real	issues	of	present	day	public	finances.	The	planning	model	expresses	the	rationale	of	efficient	government;	it	 supplies	 us	 with	 a	 norm	 against	 which	 the	 accomplishments	 of	 our	 actual	revenue-expenditure	process	may	be	checked	(ibid.,	324).	
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2.	A	turning	point	for	the	theory	of	public	expenditures	
2.1.	The	first	half	of	the	1950s	During	World	War	 II,	Musgrave	was	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 fiscal	 policy	 affairs	 at	 the	 Board	 of	Governors	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 (Musgrave	 1997).	 The	 possibility	 of	 a	 contraction	following	 demobilization	 was	 a	 preoccupation	 shared	 by	 many	 American	 economists	working	 in	 government	 agencies	 (Backhouse	 2015,	 341).	 Public	 expenditures	 for	stabilizing	 the	 business	 cycle	 was	 a	 new	 concern	 for	Musgrave.	 Public	 works	 and	 other	government	transfers	to	sustain	demand	in	times	of	crisis	had	to	be	chosen	“on	their	own	merits”	(Musgrave	1945,	14),	but	a	specific	micro	rationale	was	still	lacking.	The	arguments	to	justify	public	funding	for	some	goods	over	others	were	still	interwoven.	
Retrospectively,	 this	 confusion	 is	 also	 visible	 in	 other	 writings	 of	 the	 1940s.	 For	instance,	 Bowen	 (1948),	 who	 refers	 to	 Musgrave	 (1939)	 among	 many	 other	 eclectic	sources,	 argues	 that	 social	 goods	 are	 indivisible	 and	 non-excludable,	 but	 he	 seems	 to	confound	the	two	ideas:	
The	goods	 for	which	price	exclusion	 is	 impracticable	are	characterized	by	 the	 fact	that	 they	cannot	be	divided	up	 into	units	which	any	single	 individual	can	be	given	exclusive	 possession.	 They	 are,	 in	 this	 sense,	 indivisible.	 Such	 goods	 have	 the	characteristic	 that	 they	 become	 part	 of	 the	 general	 environment—available	 to	 all	individuals	who	live	within	that	environment.	They	are,	in	that	sense,	social	rather	than	strictly	individual	goods	(Bowen	1948,	173).		 At	Michigan	during	the	1950s,	Musgrave	“resumed	the	problems	of	[his]	thesis	and	formulated	[his]	ideas	on	the	nature	of	the	public	sector”	(Musgrave	1986	p.	ix),	which	led	to	the	publication	of	The	Theory	of	Public	Finance	at	the	end	of	the	decade.	 	There	is	little	evidence	of	Musgrave’s	progress	in	this	work.	Peacock	(1953,	1992)	recalls	having	read	a	
	 13	
draft	of	 the	Theory	when	he	 first	met	Musgrave	 in	1953.	A	department	report	 from	1954	notes	 that	 “Richard	 A.	 Musgrave	 is	 currently	 completing	 a	 volume	 devoted	 to	 a	 re-evaluation	and	synthesis	of	existing	theories	of	monetary	and	fiscal	policies.”13	A	year	later,	Samuelson	(1955,	334)	refers	 to	a	preliminary	version	of	Musgrave’s	Theory	 to	which	he	had	 access.	 In	 the	 spring	 of	 1955,	Musgrave	wrote	 to	 Peacock	 that	 he	 expected	 to	 have	finished	the	manuscript	by	the	end	of	the	year.	It	is	not	clear	why	the	manuscript	was	only	submitted	to	McGraw	Hill	more	than	two	years	later.14	
Samuelson’s	(1954)	paper	certainly	had	an	effect	on	Musgrave’s	thinking	on	public	goods.	The	three-page	paper	pretentiously	titled	‘The	pure	theory	of	public	expenditure’15	is	 presented	 as	 an	 appendix	 to	 his	 Foundations	 (1947)	 and	 was	 written	 to	 prove	 that	mathematics	 can	be	useful	 in	economics	 (Pickhardt	2006).16	 In	 it,	 Samuelson	derives	 the	
																																																								13	 Survey	 of	 the	 behavioral	 sciences:	 report	 of	 the	 faculty	 committee	 and	 report	 of	 the	 visiting	committee.	Ann	Arbor,	University	of	Michigan,	1954,	p.	38.	
14	Musgrave	to	Alan	Peacock,	March	16,	1955.	Alan	T.	Peacock	Papers,	ms38965/9/2,	University	of	St	Andrews.	Musgrave	planned	to	spend	the	1955-1956	academic	year	on	sabbatical	leave	to	finish	the	manuscript,	before	spending	a	few	months	in	Europe	(Musgrave	to	Peacock).	But	in	May	1958,	he	wrote	to	Samuelson	that	the	manuscript	would	go	to	press	soon	and	that	he	expected	to	receive	proofs	by	September	(Musgrave	to	Samuelson,	May	29	1958,	PAS	Papers).	
15	 In	 an	 unpublished	 response	 to	 critics	 of	 his	 1954–1955	 papers,	 he	 admits:	 “All	 agree	 that	my	paper	was	pretentious.	While	 the	critics	agree	 that	 I	am	crazy	 in	 thinking	myself	 to	be	Napoleon,	they	 differ	 among	 themselves	 in	 their	 reasons,	 since	 a	 sizeable	 fraction	 think	 themselves	 to	 be	Napoleon.	I	once	thought	that	if	only	I	had	omitted	the	word	‘the’	from	my	title	‘The	Pure	Theory	of	Public	Expenditure’	most	of	my	punishment	could	have	been	avoided.	But	doing	that	in	the	second	paper	 got	 me	 nowhere,	 and	 it	 availed	 me	 naught	 to	 give	 at	 the	 1955	 Xmas	 Meetings	 the	 most	neutral	 title	 possible–namely	 Some	 Aspects	 of	 An	 Abstract	 model	 of	 Public	 Expenditure	 Theory	[Samuelson	(1955)].”	 ‘Response	to	Critics	of	his	1954–55	Papers	on	Public	Expenditure’,	undated,	PAS	Papers,	Duke	University,	Unpublished	Writings,	Box	143.	
16	Unpublished	 comments	of	 Samuelson	not	 available	 to	Pickhardt	 (2006)	 corroborate	his	 thesis:	“My	 1954	 paper	 did	 pay	 proper	 acknowledgments	 to	 my	 predecessors,	 particularly	 Wicksell,	Lindahl,	 Musgrave,	 and	 Bowen.	 But	 its	 austere	 brevity	 was	 conditioned	 by	 an	 epigrammatic	demonstration	of	 the	usefulness	of	mathematical	 symbolism.”	 ‘Public	Goods	Twenty	Years	Later’,	June	1974,	PAS	papers,	Box	143.	
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necessary	 conditions	 for	 Pareto-optimal	 allocation	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 collective	consumption	goods.	For	each	of	them,	the	total	quantity	of	the	good	in	the	economy	is	the	quantity	 consumed	 by	 each	 and	 every	 agent.17	 In	 other	words,	 the	 same	 unit	 of	 good	 is	collectively	and	simultaneously	consumed	by	all	agents	in	the	economy,	which	means	that	“each	 individual	 consumption	 of	 such	 a	 good	 leads	 to	 no	 subtraction	 from	 any	 other	individual’s	consumption	of	that	good”	(Samuelson	1954,	387).	
By	deriving	the	necessary	conditions	for	optimal	allocation,	Samuelson	(1954)	fully	integrated	the	concept	of	collective	(public)	good	into	the	framework	of	the	New	Welfare	Economics	 (Musgrave	 1969b,	 798).	 It	 is	 one	 of	 the	 first	 steps	 in	 the	mathematization	 of	public	finance	and	its	transformation	into	public	economics.	As	Musgrave	(1983,	324)	later	acknowledged,	it	contributed	to	changing	the	focus	of	the	subfield,	from	a	description,	or	a	rationalization	of	what	the	state	was	doing,	into	a	study	of	efficiency	conditions	in	the	face	of	market	failures	(on	which	see	also	Johnson	2015c).	
Samuelson’s	(1954)	paper	was	indeed	a	game-changer	in	the	theorization	of	public	expenditures,	but	 it	 relied	on	previous	 conceptual	work	by	Musgrave.	 In	his	own	words:	“All	I	ever	knew	about	the	Wicksell–Lindahl	Paradigm	of	Public	Goods,	I	learned	only	from	Musgrave’s	1937	Ph.D.	dissertation”	(Ott	et	al.	2008,	333).18	Seventy	years	after,	Musgrave	seemed	to	remember	the	discussions	he	had	with	Samuelson	on	the	nature	of	public	goods:	
																																																								17	 Rather	 than	 summing	 up	 the	 quantities	 as	 one	 would	 do	 for	 private	 goods,	 one	 gets	 X =X! for all agent  i.	
18	In	an	unpublished	paper,	Samuelson	gives	a	slightly	different	version	of	the	story:	“All	I	knew	of	Lindahl’s	1919	German	and	Swedish	text	was	a	vague	remembrance	of	one	diagram	from	Richard	Musgrave’s	 1938	 Quarterly	 Journal	 summary	 of	 his	 Harvard	 thesis	 on	 the	 voluntary	 exchange	theory.	However,	this	diagram	is	really	all	one	needs	to	know	about	Lindahl.”	‘Public	Goods	Twenty	Years	 Later’,	 June	 1974,	 PAS	 papers,	 Box	 143.	 p.	 1.	 As	 early	 as	 the	 1960s,	 Head	 (1962,	 198)	
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I	 (Richard)	 especially	 thank	 you	 for	 the	 inspiration	 you	 gave	 to	 those	 of	 us	 who	attended	Alvin’s	seminar	in	the	late	’30s.	I	vividly	recall	a	conversation	with	you	on	our	way	from	Littauer	to	the	Faculty	Club	on	whether	nonrival	consumption	or	non-excludability	serves	as	the	crucial	distinction	between	public	and	private	goods.19	Musgrave’s	wife	also	recalls	such	discussions:	“I	well	remember	Richard	and	Paul	getting	together	on	a	Sunday	morning	to	discuss	the	solution	to	the	provision	of	social	goods.”20	
As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	 Musgrave	 and	 Samuelson	maintained	 a	 life-long	 friendship.21	They	 held	 each	 other	 in	 high	 esteem.	When	 Samuelson	was	 asked	 to	 provide	 advice	 on	Musgrave	 for	 grant	 applications,	 or	 university	 appointments,	 he	 always	 spoke	 highly	 of	him:	“Musgrave	and	Boulding	are	the	jewels	in	Michigan’s	crown	and	it	will	be	a	grievous	loss	 to	 them	 if	 you	 should	 attract	him	away”	 (Letter	 to	Garner,	 Johns	Hopkins,	 1958).	 In	recommending	 Musgrave	 for	 a	 second	 Guggenheim	 Fellowship,	 he	 wrote:	 “Professor	Musgrave	is	undoubtedly	the	authority	in	the	whole	field	of	public	finance”	(Letter	to	Ray,	1964).	 After	 Musgrave	 passed	 away,	 Samuelson	 remarked:	 “Whether	 at	 Swarthmore	 or	Michigan	or	Hopkins	or	Princeton	or	Harvard,	 if	Dick	was	there,	he	sat	at	the	head	of	the	
																																																																																																																																																																																		remarked:	 “Stimulated	by	 the	researches	of	Professor	Musgrave.	Samuelson	has	now	opened	 this	still	 far-from-empty	 box,	 and	 has	 set	 loose	 upon	 an	 ill-prepared	 literature	 a	 fully	 fledged	mathematical	theory	of	public	expenditure,	based	upon	this	concept	alone.”	
19	Richard	and	Peggy	Musgrave	to	Samuelson	(on	the	occasion	of	his	90th	birthday),	May	20	2005,	Correspondence’,	PAS	Papers,	“Musgrave,	Richard,	1945–2007	Box	54”.	
20	 In	a	 letter	to	Wallace	Oates,	she	also	wrote:	“As	Paul	Samuelson	has	often	pointed	out,	his	own	seminal	 paper	 on	 public	 expenditures	 grew	 out	 of	 Richard’s	 work	 on	 public	 goods	 many	 years	before,	which	 they	had	discussed	a	number	of	 times.”	Peggy	Musgrave	 to	W.	Oates,	 July	12	2008.	RAM	Papers,	‘Correspondence’,	Box	3.	
21	 They	 met	 at	 Harvard	 when	 Samuelson	 arrived	 in	 1935.	 From	 1937	 to	 1955,	 they	 both	participated	regularly	in	the	Fiscal	Policy	seminar	directed	by	John	H.	Williams	and	Alvin	H.	Hansen	in	 the	 Littauer	 building	 at	 Harvard	 (“Official	 Register	 of	 Harvard	 University",	http://www.irwincollier.com/harvard-economics-hansen-and-williams-fiscal-seminar-1937-1944/).	 In	the	1950s,	Samuelson	and	Musgrave	were	both	part	of	 the	Fineletter	group,	a	circle	of	economists	advising	Democratic	candidate	Adlai	Stevenson	II	(Schlesinger	and	Harris	1957,	p.	xx).	
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round	table”	(2007).	Musgrave,	for	his	part,	considered	Samuelson	“the	greatest	economist	of	the	20th	century.”22	
If	 Musgrave	 and	 Samuelson	 discussed	 public	 goods	 theory	 in	 the	 1930s,	 there	 is	unfortunately	no	trace	of	Musgrave’s	writing	on	the	topic	between	his	1941	paper	and	the	first	exposition	of	his	Theory	published	in	1957.	But	it	is	likely	that	Musgrave	had	drafted	material	for	the	first	chapter	before	Samuelson	published	his	paper.	In	the	aforementioned	letter	 to	 Peacock	 from	 1955,	 Musgrave	 remarked:	 “You	 may	 have	 seen	 a	 recent	contribution	by	Samuelson	in	the	Review	of	Economics	and	Statistics	for	November	1954,	proceeding	 much	 along	 the	 same	 lines	 as	 I	 did,	 but	 of	 course,	 with	 more	 mathematical	elegance.”	Perhaps	Musgrave	was	referring	here	to	the	manuscript	Peacock	had	read	when	they	met	in	1953.	23	
At	the	annual	convention	of	the	American	Economic	Association	in	December	1955,	Musgrave	 and	 Samuelson	 co-organized	 a	 session	 (jointly	 sponsored	 by	 the	 Econometric	Society)	on	the	Theory	of	public	expenditures.	Musgrave	presented	a	paper	in	which	he	set	forth	the	basic	structure	of	his	normative	Theory	in	three	branches	(the	service	branch,	the	distribution	 branch,	 and	 the	 stabilization	 branch)	 that	 correspond	 to	 the	 three	 main	
																																																								22	Respectively,	 Samuelson	 to	W.	R.	Garner,	May	9	1958;	Samuelson	 to	Gordon	N.	Ray,	December	1964;	Speech	at	Harvard	Memorial	Chapel,	May	18	2007,	‘Correspondence’,	PAS	Papers,	“Musgrave,	Richard,	 1945–2007	 Box	 54”;	 and	 Musgrave	 interviewed	 by	 Karen	 I.	 Horn.	 published	 in	 the	
Frankfurter	Allgemeine	Zeitung,	March	26,	2006.	RAM	Papers,	Box	7.	
23	The	quote	is	from	the	letter	from	Musgrave	to	Peacock,	March	16,	1955.	Alan	T.	Peacock	Papers.	University	of	St	Andrews.	In	a	paper	published	two	year	earlier	(in	French),	Peacock	(1953,	442)	wrote:	“The	discussion	of	the	theory	of	collective	wants	that	he	[Musgrave]	introduces	in	his	
Principles	of	the	Public	Economy	(forthcoming)	is	extremely	original	and	interesting.”	(my	translation)	
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functions	of	the	public	budget.24	Each	branch	performs	its	function	on	the	assumption	that	the	two	others	will	meet	their	objectives.	For	the	service	branch,	which	is	responsible	for	determining	 the	 goods	 and	 service	 that	 must	 be	 provided	 to	 satisfy	 public	 wants,	 this	means	that	a	“proper”	state	of	distribution	has	been	secured	by	the	distribution	branch	and	that	full	employment	is	guaranteed	by	the	stabilization	branch.	This	implies	that	the	service	branch	 can	 balance	 its	 budget,	 or	 that	 public	 services	 can	 be	 provided	 according	 to	 the	benefit	 principle	 that	 links	 revenues	 and	 expenditures	 together.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	merit	wants,	which	 arise	 out	 of	 a	 problem	of	 separating	 the	 service	 and	 the	distribution	branch	in	the	case	of	transfers	in	kind.	
Musgrave	had	 changed	his	 view	on	 the	nature	of	 public	wants.	Rather	 than	being	homogenized	at	the	social	 level	by	the	social	planner,	he	assumed	from	now	on	that	they	are	individual	wants.	Contrary	to	what	he	argued	in	his	dissertation,	and	moving	closer	to	the	voluntary	exchange	theorists,	he	now	claimed	that	both	private	and	public	wants	“are	part	of	one	and	the	same	subjective	preference	systems	of	 individuals”	(Musgrave	1957a,	334),	the	main	difference	between	the	two	being	that	“goods	and	services	supplied	in	the	satisfaction	of	public	wants	must	be	consumed	in	equal	amount	by	all	 [original	emphasis]”	(ibid.)	 This	 change	 of	 assumption	 reflects	 both	 the	 increasing	 hold	 of	 methodological	individualism	in	welfare	economics,	and	more	generally	the	reformulation	of	all	branches	of	economics	 into	the	 language	of	market	 theory.	The	social	perspective,	or	 the	collective	interest,	 had	 to	 be	 conceptualized	 in	 strictly	 individualistic	 terms,	 as	 exemplified	 by	Samuelson’s	 discussion	 on	welfare	 economics	 in	 his	Foundations	 (1947)	 and	Buchanan’s																																																									24	 Samuelson	 presented	 a	 paper	 titled	 “Aspects	 of	 the	 Abstract	 Theory	 of	 Public	 Expenditures”	which	 would	 be	 published	 in	 1958	 (“Report	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Meeting.	 December	 27-30,	 1955,	
Econometrica,	24(3):	338-353).	
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(1949)	“individualistic	approach”	to	government	finance.	Moreover,	to	the	extent	that	the	market	became	a	benchmark,	individual	valuations	were	basic	to	the	demand	side.25	
Musgrave	 (1957a)	 draws	 two	 inferences	 on	 social	 wants.	 First,	 if	 a	 voluntary	solution	 were	 possible,	 then	 the	 aggregate	 demand	 curve	 for	 an	 indivisible	 good	 must	result	 from	the	vertical	addition	of	 the	 individual	demands	(that	 is	 for	a	 fixed	quantity	of	the	good,	the	individual	monetary	contributions	are	added	up).	This	result	can	be	derived	from	Lindahl’s	 (1919)	model	 and	was	 stated	 in	 those	 terms	by	Bowen	 (1943,	1948)	and	later	restated	by	Samuelson	(1955).	Second,		
since	the	same	amount	will	be	consumed	by	all,	 individuals	know	that	they	cannot	be	excluded	from	the	resulting	benefits.	This	being	the	case,	they	are	not	forced	to	reveal	 their	 preferences	 through	bidding	 in	 the	market.	 The	 “exclusion	principle,”	which	is	essential	to	exchange,	cannot	be	applied;	and	the	market	mechanism	does	not	work	(Musgrave	1957a).	In	 this	 quotation,	 Musgrave	 draws	 a	 causal	 explanation	 of	 market	 failure	 from	 the	distinctive	character	of	public	wants.	Clearly	here	both	 the	 indivisibility	or	 jointness,	and	the	 impossibly	of	exclusion	are	 linked	together.26	Musgrave	 infers	non-excludability	 from	the	jointness	dimension	of	public	wants.27	In	a	sense,	this	claim	is	tautological.	If	somebody	were	 excluded,	 then	 there	 would	 be	 at	 least	 one	 individual	 not	 consuming	 the	 good,	
																																																								25	This	is	typical	of	the	postwar	theory	of	market	failures,	as	for	instance	in	the	conceptualizations	of	externalities	(see	Medema	2015).	
26	 Head	 (1970)	 remarked	 that	 indivisibility	 is	 a	 confusing	 all-encompassing	 criterion,	 but,	 as	Ver	Eecke	(1999)	has	argued,	 it	 is	closer	to	non-rivalry	than	to	non-exclusion.	To	put	 it	briefly,	 to	say	 that	 the	 same	unit	 of	 a	 good	 is	 consumed	 collectively	 and	 cannot	 be	divided	 is	 equivalent	 to	saying	that	the	consumption	of	this	unit	is	non-rival,	or	that	one’s	enjoyment	does	not	subtract	any	benefit	from	another’s	enjoyment	of	the	same	good.	
27	In	a	paper	presented	the	same	year	at	hearings	of	the	JEC	(US	Congress),	Musgrave	(1957b,	110)	defends	a	similar	view.	
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therefore	 it	would	not	be	a	public	good	according	to	this	definition.28	Thus,	knowing	that	they	cannot	be	excluded,	individuals	will	not	be	forced	to	reveal	their	preferences	and	the	market	fails	both	as	a	mechanism	of	preference	revelation	(to	know	which	goods	in	what	quantity	must	be	produced),	but	also—as	was	already	clear	in	1939—as	a	way	to	pay	for	the	goods.	
2.2.	The	effect	of	Samuelson’s	paper	As	 it	 has	 been	 expounded,	 Musgrave’s	 definition	 of	 public	 wants	 in	 1955/1957	clearly	reflects	Samuelson’s	definition	of	“equal	consumption	by	all.”	Moreover,	his	shift	to	a	 more	 individually	 based	 assumption	 about	 public	 wants	 probably	 also	 reflects	Samuelson’s	 transformation	 of	 Lindahl’s	 model	 into	 necessary	 conditions	 for	 optimal	provision,	 but	 without	 the	 assumption	 of	 voluntary	 provision.	 As	 he	 put	 it:	 “our	 view	borrows	from	Lindahl’s	formulation	provided	that	we	interpret	it	as	an	optimal	result	and	not	 as	 an	 operational	 solution”	 (Musgrave	 1957a,	 335).	 Yet,	 this	 new	 result	 probably	changed	 neither	 Musgrave’s	 nor	 Samuelson’s	 general	 view	 about	 the	 role	 of	 the	government	 in	 society.	 After	 Musgrave’s	 1939	 intuition	 about	 free	 riding,	 it	 provided	another	important	step	in	the	construction	of	a	convincing	argument	for	public	funding	of	some	 goods	 and	 services.	 Musgrave	 and	 Samuelson	 held	 on	 to	 their	 view	 in	 the	 face	 of	criticism	 from	 defenders	 of	 free	 market	 economics.	 As	 some	 market-like	 arrangements	emerged	 to	 criticize	 the	 market-failure	 diagnosis,	 Samuelson	 expressed	 doubts	 towards	them.																																																									28	 This	 argument	 was	 stated	 (in	 different	 terms)	 by	 Head	 (1962,	 205).	 This	 ambiguity	 can	 be	resolved	 if	 “consumed	 in	 equal	 amounts	 by	 all”	 is	 replaced	 by	 non-rivalry,	 or	 if	 one	 introduces	another	dimension	such	as	the	size	of	the	interacting	group,	something	that	neither	Musgrave	nor	Samuelson	did	explicitly.	
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Commenting	 on	 Tiebout’s	 (1956)	 model,	 in	 which	 taxpayers	 express	 their	preference	 for	 public	 goods	 by	 voting	 with	 their	 feet,	 thereby	 recreating	 a	 market-like	voluntary	 system,	 Samuelson	 asserted	 his	 moral	 repulsion	 at	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	model:	
People	want	 to	 “improve”	 their	 community,	not	abdicate	 from	 it.	 Secondly,	people	often	 like	heterogeneity	even	 though	 it	 involves	conflict.	 […]	 In	an	 interdependent	world,	 one	 man’s	 privacy	 is	 another	 man’s	 condemnation	 to	 loneliness.	 Thirdly,	there	is	the	political	and	ethical	question	whether	groups	of	like-minded	individuals	shall	be	“free”	to	“run	out”	on	their	social	responsibilities	and	go	off	by	themselves.	At	 the	 national	 level,	 society	 respects	 no	 such	 freedom:	 e.g.,	 migration	 control,	compulsory	taxation,	etc.	(Samuelson	1958,	337)29	Although	 Samuelson	 built	 for	 himself	 an	 identity	 of	 a	 technical	 value-free	 expert	 (Maas	2014),	at	times,	his	values	are	apparent	in	his	analysis.	In	an	unpublished	paper,	Samuelson	uses	a	slightly	irritated	tone	to	reiterated	his	view	that	market	arrangements	cannot	work	for	public	goods:	
This	 last	 finding	 of	 the	 theory	 was	 resisted	 by	many	modern	 writers	 (such	 as	 S.	Enke,	 J.	M.	Buchanan,	Charles	Tiebout,	Ronald	Coase,	and	Milton	Friedman)	 just	as	Wicksell,	 Lindahl,	 and	 older	 writers	 had	 unsuccessfully	 wrestled	 with	 the	 same	issue.	 Still	 a	 logic	 is	 a	 logic	 and	 facts	 are	 facts.	 No	 one	 of	 the	 writers	 named,	 or	anyone	else	to	my	knowledge,	has	been	able	to	refute	the	theorem:	[...]	 there	is	no	decentralized	algorithm	(pricing	or	otherwise)	that	will	both	define	an	equilibrium	and	(without	central	 intelligence	or	coercion)	motivate	 individuals	 to	achieve	 it.	 If	this	fact	about	the	universe	be	deemed	a	sad	fact,	it	is	not	one	of	my	making.	Nor	is	it	a	new	fact:	it	existed	even	before	1776;	only	our	full	knowledge	of	it	is	new.	(“Public	Good	Theory:	Optimal	Feasible	Pricing	of	Rail,	Bridge,	and	Road,”	rough	draft	7	Feb.	1964,	PAS	Papers.)	Here,	Samuelson	is	trying	to	support	his	interventionist	position	(on	which	see	Horn	2009)	by	 invoking	 positive	 arguments.	 Perhaps	 Samuelson	would	 not	 go	 as	 far	 as	Musgrave	 in	
																																																								29	 Tiebout	 first	 discussed	 his	model	 in	Musgrave’s	 public	 finance	 seminar	 at	 Ann	 Arbor	 (Fischel	2006).	Although	Musgrave	was	somewhat	proud	of	this,	he	was	very	critical	about	the	applicability	of	the	model	(Buchanan	and	Musgrave	1999,	158).	On	Tiebout,	see	Singleton	(2015).		
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arguing	 that	 collective	 choice	 through	 voting	 can	 solve	 the	 problem,	 but	 at	 least	 he	identifies	the	enemies:	Buchanan	and	Coase,	among	others.	
Musgrave	(1983,	328)	shared	Samuelson’s	doubts	about	the	possibility	of	a	market-like	 revealing	mechanism.	 As	 I	 have	 argued,	Musgrave	 already	 held	 that	 the	 state	 had	 a	positive	role	to	play	in	the	welfare	of	the	citizens.	Samuelson’s	model	served	as	a	step	in	the	construction	 of	 a	 convincing	 argument	 for	 economists.	 Even	 though	 it	 did	 not	 convince	everyone,	 public	 provision	 of	 collective	 goods	was	 a	widely	 accepted	 view	 in	 the	 1960s,	until	 attitudes	 about	 the	 government’s	 ability	 to	 deliver	 on	 its	 promises	 slowly	 began	 to	change	 among	 economists	 in	 the	 1970s	 (Bernstein	 2001,	 Chapter	6;	 Backhouse	 2005;	Madra	 and	 Adaman	 2010;	 Tanzi	 2011,	 134).	 In	 a	 sense,	 the	 theory	 of	 public	 goods	 is	 a	rationalization	of	values	and	worldviews	that	were	not	uncommon	at	the	time	of	increasing	governmental	 responsibilities	 in	 the	 welfare	 of	 American	 citizens.	 In	 2004,	 Musgrave	served	as	blind	referee	for	Pickhardt’s	(2006)	paper	published	in	the	Journal	of	the	history	
of	 economic	 thought.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 his	 report,	 he	 noted	 how,	 in	 retrospect,	 Samuelson’s	model	had	the	effect	of	providing	another	argument	for	market	failure	that	fitted	the	spirit	of	the	time:	
As	 the	 author	 notes,	 the	 bombshell	 effect	 of	 Samuelson’s	 first	 paper	 was	 to	 be	explained	 by	 its	 theoretical	 brilliance	 of	 presenting	 the	 complex	 issue	 of	 public	goods	 in	so	succinct	a	 form.	But	 there	may	have	been	more	 to	 it.	Even	 findings	of	pure	 theory	may	have	 their	 ideological	 settings	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 public	 goods	seemed	to	offer	the	penultimate	cause	of	market	failure,	questioning	the	role	of	the	market	as	the	universal	and	natural	solution	to	human	coexistence.	In	the	’50s,	this	critique	still	appealed	to	a	liberal	political	climate,	following	earlier	critiques	by	Joan	Robinson,	Keynes,	Samuelson,	Hansen,	and	others.30																																																									30	“Comments	for	author,”	Musgrave	to	Medema	(Editor	of	JHET),	June	7th	2004,	RAM	Papers,	Box	3,	 ‘Papers	 other’.	 Quotation	 with	 permission	 from	 Steven	 G.	 Medema.	 Michael	 Pickhardt	 passed	away	in	2012.	
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In	 as	 much	 as	 a	 model	 is	 a	 rationalization	 of	 contemporary	 concerns	 held	 by	 citizens,	political	leaders,	or	economists,	it	is	hard	to	separate	its	positive	value	from	the	normative	narrative	 that	 might	 be	 derived	 from	 it.31	 In	 a	 sense,	 Samuelson’s	 abstract	 model	 is	 a	thought	 experiment	 that	 rationalizes	 government	 provision	 of	 certain	 goods	 in	 the	language	of	modern	economics.	In	this	simplified	world,	the	reader	discovers	that	when	the	state’s	 coercive	 power	 is	 assumed	 away,	 collective	 goods	 are	 not	 provided	 in	 sufficient	quantity	to	reach	a	social	optimum.	
	
2.3.	Musgrave’s	Theory	of	Public	Finance	(1959)	Although	 Musgrave’s	 definition	 of	 social	 goods	 in	 the	 1950s	 reflected	 Samuelson’s	influence,	 he	 still	 believed	 that	 non-exclusion	 was	 the	 main	 argument	 for	 their	 public	provision.	Reflecting	on	the	past	20	years	of	debate,	Head	(1977a,	228)	remarked	that:		
Beginning	with	 his	 1958	 paper	 [16,	 p.	 335],	 Samuelson	 has,	 however,	 repeatedly	insisted	 that	 the	 jointness	 characteristic	 is	 in	 some	 sense	 more	 basic	 than	impossibility	of	price	exclusion,	and	 there	 is	 some	evidence	 that	he	has	converted	both	Musgrave	and	Buchanan	to	this	point	of	view.		Head	 did	 not	 provide	 evidence	 for	 his	 claim,	 but	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 Musgrave	 and	Samuelson	had	discussed	the	matter	before	1958.	In	fact,	Samuelson	kept	the	comments	he	made	on	Musgrave’s	 draft	 of	 the	 first	 part	 of	 his	Theory,	which	 likely	 go	back	 at	 least	 to	1955.	One	of	Samuelson’s	main	contentions	is	on	the	nature	of	public	goods:																																																									31	Similarly,	twenty	years	before	Samuelson’s	paper	appeared,	Einaudi	(1934,	26)	remarked	that	De	Viti	 de	Marco’s	Principles	 of	 Public	 Finance	was	 a	 “reflection”	 in	 the	 field	 of	 public	 finance	 of	 the	transition	 to	 more	 democratic/popular	 government	 over	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 in	 Italy.	 This	reflection	 took	 the	 form	 of	 “fundamental	 types”	 abstracted	 from	 the	 facts.	 This	 view	 is	 also	expressed	by	Myrdal	(1930,	157):	“All	normative	economic	doctrines	are	largely	rationalizations	of	political	attitudes	and	in	the	theory	of	public	finance	probably	even	more	than	elsewhere	because	stronger	political	pressures	are	at	work	here.”	
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I	think	your	emphasis	on	the	“exclusion	principle”	is	extremely	important.	However,	I	think	at	some	later	point	I	should	want	further	discussion	and	a	number	of	further	distinctions	 to	 be	 made.	 [...]	 Quite	 aside	 from	 any	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 the	exclusion	 principle,	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 a	 condition	 as	 decreasing	 costs	will	 not	only	make	perfect	competition	non-viable	as	a	predictive	statement,	but	it	will	also	create	normative	inadequacies	of	the	market	mechanism.32	Thus,	Samuelson	(1955)	argued	that	collective	goods	in	the	sense	he	defined	them	were	a	specific	case	of	the	more	general	problem	of	decreasing	costs,	 the	latter	being	the	proper	reason	for	departing	from	the	rule	of	pricing	at	marginal	cost.	He	continues:	
Your	paragraph	dealing	with	 joint	consumption	seems	to	me	to	be	not	completely	satisfactory.	Concerts	are	a	wonderful	example	of	decreasing	cost	situation	in	which	optimal	pricing	according	 to	marginal	 cost	might	 require	 that	 you	 set	 zero	prices.	[...]	If	you	could	find	a	way	of	learning	when	people	listen	in	to	the	radio,	you	might	apply	the	exclusion	principle	to	this	area.	Yet,	you	would	be	wrong	in	discouraging	people	from	getting	more	satisfaction	from	listening	in	an	extra	hour	when	there	is	no	 true	 cost	 to	 society	 of	 their	 listening	 in	 that	 extra	 hour.	 Something	 like	 joint	consumption	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 governmental	 services.	 Or	 to	 put	 the	 matter	 in	reverse	way:	the	market	mechanism	and	the	exclusion	principle	work	well	only	 in	the	 very	 special	 case	 where	 there	 happen	 to	 be	 no	 ‘external’	 effects	 on	 the	consumption	side.	Samuelson’s	argument	to	convince	Musgrave	is	already	clear:	In	the	case	of	a	good	which	can	be	provided	at	zero	(or	small)	marginal	cost,	even	if	exclusion	was	feasible,	it	would	not	be	 Pareto	 optimal	 to	 impede	 another	 user	 from	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 good.33	 Hence,	 it	 is	“jointness	 in	 demand”,	 or	 “external	 economies”	 (Samuelson	 1954)	 or	 “decreasing	 cost”	(Samuelson	 1955)	 that	 account	 for	 the	 market	 failure	 of	 public	 goods,	 according	 to	Samuelson.	This	argument	would	be	stressed	by	Samuelson	over	and	over	again.		
																																																								32	 “Detailed	 comments	 on	 PRINCIPLES	 OF	 THE	 PUBLIC	 ECONOMY.”	 Undated,	 but	 inserted	 in	 a	chronologically	 ordered	 folder	 between	 a	 letter	 from	 1951	 and	 another	 from	 1955.	 It	 seems	reasonable	to	date	this	6-page	document	at	 the	 latest	 from	1955,	recalling	that	Samuelson	(1955,	354)	noted:	“I	have	greatly	benefited	from	preliminary	study	of	Professor	Musgrave’s	forthcoming	treatise	 on	 public	 finance,	which	 I	 am	 sure	will	 constitute	 a	 landmark	 in	 this	 area.”,	 PAS	 Papers,	‘Correspondence’,	“Musgrave,	Richard,	1945–2007	Box	54”	
33	This	argument	was	already	formulated	by	Buchanan	(1951,	174).	
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In	the	published	version	of	the	Theory,	Musgrave	renames	the	service	branch	as	the	
allocation	branch.	Its	function	is	to	provide	for	the	satisfaction	of	public	wants,	which	are	of	two	 kinds:	 social	 wants	 and	merit	 wants.	 Notice	 the	 slight	 difference	 from	 the	 previous	definition	given	in	1957a:	
Social	wants	are	those	wants	satisfied	by	services	that	must	be	consumed	in	equal	amounts	by	all.	People	who	do	not	pay	for	the	services	cannot	be	excluded	from	the	benefits	that	result;	and	since	they	cannot	be	excluded	from	the	benefits,	 they	will	not	 engage	 in	 voluntary	 payments.	 Hence	 the	 market	 cannot	 satisfy	 such	 wants.	Budgetary	provision	is	needed	if	they	are	to	be	satisfied	at	all.	(Musgrave	1959,	8)	Here,	 the	 impossibility	 of	 exclusion	 is	 not	 inferred	 from	 the	 jointness	 in	consumption.	 Musgrave	 argues	 that	 this	 specificity	 leads	 to	 two	 problems.	 First,	preferences	 will	 not	 be	 revealed,	 hence	 the	 government	 has	 to	 find	 a	 way	 to	 “induce”	citizens	 to	 reveal	 them.	 Second,	 even	 if	 preferences	 were	 known,	 contrary	 to	 market	functioning,	 there	 is	 no	 single	 given	 optimal	 solution.	 Thus	 a	 social	 welfare	 function	 is	required	 to	 select	 the	 desired	 state	 of	 distribution.34	 Musgrave	 adds	 some	 further	clarification	on	social	wants:	“[S]uch	wants	cannot	be	satisfied	through	the	mechanism	of	the	market	because	their	enjoyment	cannot	be	made	subject	to	price	payment”	(ibid.,	9,	my	emphasis).	In	the	case	of	private	goods,	property	rights	entitle	the	owner	to	exclude	others	from	 enjoying	 the	 benefits	 she	 derives	 from	 the	 good.	 This	 is	 what	 Musgrave	 calls	 “the	exclusion	 principle”	 and	 it	 does	 not	 apply	 in	 the	 case	 of	 social	 wants.	 Hence,	 Musgrave	(1959)	believed	that	it	is	the	impossibility	of	exclusion	that	is	the	cause	of	market	failure.35	
																																																								
34	Head	and	Samuelson	remarked	that	Musgrave	is	wrong	on	this,	since	even	in	a	world	of	purely	private	goods,	there	is	rarely	a	single	optimum.	
35	As	early	as	the	nineteenth	century,	Wagner	(1892,	419)	had	argued	that	there	was	an	exclusion	problem	for	public	services.	Mazzola	(1890,	42),	who	referred	to	the	second	edition	of	Wagner’s	
Grundlegung,	identified	a	technical	characteristic	to	explain	the	public	provision	of	some	goods,	
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As	in	the	1939	and	1941	papers,	the	most	important	remarks	on	social	goods	in	the	1959	book	are	to	be	found	in	a	footnote:	
It	is	evident	that	the	case	of	social	wants	must	involve	joint	consumption,	but	joint	consumption,	as	usually	defined,	does	not	necessarily	involve	social	wants.	A	circus	performance	 involves	 joint	 consumption	 on	 the	 part	 of	 those	 who	 attend.	 Yet	entrance	fees	can	be	charged,	different	amounts	can	be	consumed	by	various	people	and	 the	 service	 can	 be	 provided	 through	 the	 market.	 Demand	 schedules	 can	 be	added	 horizontally.	 (See	 p.	 76).	 For	 a	 social	want	 to	 arise,	 the	 condition	 of	 equal	consumption	must	apply	 to	all,	whether	 they	pay	or	not.	 In	other	words,	we	must	combine	 the	 condition	 of	 joint	 consumption	 with	 that	 of	 inapplicability	 of	 the	exclusion	principle.	Only	then	will	demand	schedules	be	added	vertically.	(ibid.,	10	n.1)	For	the	first	time,	it	is	clearly	stated	that	two	conditions	must	be	met	in	the	case	of	social	wants—which	on	consistency	grounds	should	have	called	for	a	rewriting	of	the	definition	of	 social	wants	 given	 earlier.	 This	 fact	 becomes	 evident	 in	 the	 case	of	 an	outdoor	 circus,	which	was	one	of	the	two	examples	of	public	goods,	along	with	national	defense,	given	by	Samuelson	 (1955,	 350).	Musgrave	 argued	 that	 circuses,	 contrary	 to	 national	 defense,	 do	not	 result	 in	market	 failure	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 private	 organizations	 can	 repay	 their	 costs	without	the	help	of	the	state.	Hence,	there	must	be	another	necessary	condition	for	market	failure	in	the	case	of	social	wants,	namely	impossibility	of	exclusion.	
Finally,	Musgrave	 reckons	 that,	 since	 voluntary	 payments	 are	 not	 possible,	 public	services	satisfying	social	wants	must	be	provided	free	of	direct	charge	(ibid.,	15).	Since	the	distribution	and	 stabilization	branches	 are	 assumed	 to	meet	 their	objectives,	 funding	 for	those	services	can	follow	the	benefit	principle.	In	practice,	this	would	imply	a	proportional	tax	 if	 the	 income	elasticity	of	demand	 is	around	one.	 If	 it	 is	 larger	 than	one,	 then	 the	 tax	would	need	to	be	progressive,	and	if	smaller	than	one,	regressive.																																																																																																																																																																																			namely	their	indivisibility.	Yet,	he	also	noted	that	this	fact	entailed	the	impossibility	of	“debarring”	users	from	the	consumption	of	those	goods.	
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Clearly,	 Samuelson	 could	 not	 have	 been	 satisfied	 with	 the	 final	 version	 of	 Musgrave’s	
Theory.	 In	 an	 unpublished	 draft	 (1959)	 intended	 as	 a	 friendly	 criticism	 of	Musgrave,	 he	argued	again:	
The	 important	 question	 is	 not	 whether	 we	 can	 exclude	 someone	 from	 use	 or	enjoyment	 of	 a	 public	 good,	 but	 rather	whether	 in	 excluding	 it	 from	one	man	we	thereby	 make	 as	 much	 more	 of	 it	 available	 to	 other	 men.	 What	 makes	 bread	 a	private	 good	 is	 that	 when	 a	 loaf	 goes	 into	 my	 stomach,	 it	 thereby	 becomes	unavailable	 for	 your	 stomach.	 [...]	 Of	 course,	 we	 could	 put	 a	 toll	 collector	 on	 an	uncrowded	road	and	charge	fees.	But	should	we?36	Musgrave	(1959)	acknowledged	Samuelson’s	point	in	a	chapter	titled	“Further	problems	in	efficiency”.	He	saw	the	case	of	an	uncrowded	bridge	as	a	“paradoxical	situation”	where	the	exclusion	 principle	 could	 be	 applied,	 but	 that	 doing	 so	 would	 result	 in	 an	 “inefficient	solution”	 because	 of	 very	 low	marginal	 costs	 (Musgrave	 1959,	 138).	 Still,	 as	 long	 as	 the	bridge	was	funded	by	toll,	Musgrave	did	not	see	it	as	a	case	of	social	good.37		
	
3.	Crystallization	of	the	two	criteria	
3.1.	Refinement	of	a	theoretical	question	in	the	1960s	In	the	1960s,	numerous	papers	were	published	on	the	definition	of	public	goods	and	their	implications	 for	 efficient	 allocation.	Although	Musgrave	 (1959)	had	 argued	 in	 the	 above-quoted	footnote	that	two	conditions	must	be	met,	it	was	not	at	all	clear	at	the	beginning	of																																																									
36	“More	on	public	goods	and	bads:	a	road	case,”1959,	PAS	Papers,	Unpublished	Writings,	Box	142.	The	 argument	 is	 repeated	 in	 “Public	 Good	 Theory:	 Optimal	 Feasible	 Pricing	 of	 Rail,	 Bridge,	 and	Road,”	rough	draft	Feb.	7	1964,	PAS	Papers,	Unpublished	Writings,	Box	143.	It	is	also	stressed	in	a	debate	on	Subscription	TV	between	Samuelson	(1958,	1964)	and	Minasian	(1964).	
37	He	conceded	 to	 see	 it	 as	a	 social	good	only	 if	 it	would	be	 funded	by	general	 taxation,	or,	more	convincingly,	 it	 it	produced	«	collateral	benefits	»	to	the	neighboring	residents	(Musgrave	1959,	p.	139).	
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the	decade	that	two	criteria	had	to	be	defined.	Probably	convinced	by	the	persuasiveness	of	his	 free	 riding	 argument,	 Musgrave	 held	 on	 to	 non-exclusion	 as	 the	 most	 important	characteristic	 of	 social	 goods	 for	 most	 of	 the	 1960s	 (see	 Musgrave	 1962,	 109;	 1964,	 4;	1965,	3).	
In	 1966,	Musgrave	 presents	 a	 paper	 titled	Provision	 for	 social	 goods,	 in	which	 he	reviews	 “the	 polar	 case	 of	 a	 pure	 social	 good”	 and	 then	 suggests	 some	 generalization	 to	mixed	 goods.	 The	 author	 explains	 the	 shift	 in	 his	 phenomenological	 view	 point:	 “To	emphasise	that	the	distinguishing	characteristic	derives	from	the	nature	of	the	good,	rather	than	 the	 utility	 function,	 I	 now	prefer	 the	 term	 social	 good	 to	my	 earlier	 terminology	 of	social	want”	 (Musgrave	1969a,	 126).	Musgrave	 then	proceeds	 to	 (re)define	 social	 goods:	“The	 first	 is	 the	 characteristic	 of	 non-rivalness	 in	 consumption,	 i.e.,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	beneficial	 consumption	 externality.	 The	 second	 is	 the	 characteristic	 of	 non-excludability	from	 consumption.	 The	 two	 are	 distinct	 features	 and	 need	 not	 coincide.	 Each	 plays	 a	different	role”	(ibid.)	This	is	the	standard	textbook	definition	that	is	still	used	today.	
Musgrave	 then	 explains	 that	 non-rivalness,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 consumption	 by	 one	individual	does	not	reduce	the	benefits	enjoyed	by	another	individual	while	consuming	the	same	 good,	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 vertical	 addition	 of	 demand	 curves.	 It	 is	 also	 this	characteristic	that	leads	to	the	different	necessary	condition	for	optimality	that	Samuelson	(1954)	 derived.	 Incidentally,	 Musgrave	 (1983,	 332,	 n.7)	 acknowledged	 that	 it	 was	Samuelson’s	(1955,	356)	claim	that	there	exists	some	“element	of	variability	in	the	benefits	that	 can	 go	 to	 one	 citizen	 at	 the	 expense	 (Musgrave’s	 emphasis)	 of	 some	 other	 citizen”	which	led	him	to	coin	the	term	non-rivalness	in	consumption	(Pickhardt	2006).	
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Musgrave	again	states	that	non-excludability	of	social	goods	leads	to	a	difficulty	 in	revealing	 preferences.	 National	 defense	 combines	 both	 characteristics,	 but	 some	 goods	exhibit	only	one	of	 the	 two.	For	 instance,	 the	orchard	that	benefits	 the	nearby	bees	gives	rise	to	a	rival	consumption	(there	is	a	depleting	amount	of	nectar	available	to	many	apiarist	neighbors),	but	 the	market	 fails	because	of	 the	 impossibility	of	exclusion,	or	of	very	high	exclusion	cost.	On	the	other	side,	an	uncrowded	bridge	 is	a	non-rival	good,	but	exclusion	and	toll	charging	is	possible.	Now,	Musgrave	argued	that	it	is	not	efficient	(Pareto-optimal)	to	exclude	anyone	from	the	consumption	of	such	a	good	since	she	would	benefit	from	it	at	no	additional	cost.	Hence,	at	this	point,	Musgrave	had	accepted	Samuelson’s	argument.38	
With	the	given	definition	of	non-rivalness	as	externality	in	consumption,	Musgrave	(1969a)	 extends	 the	 polar	 case	 to	 mixed	 cases	 by	 resorting	 to	 variations	 in	 the	characterization	 of	 the	 utility	 function	 of	 two	 consumers.	 For	 agent	 A,	 the	 polar	 case	 is	U! = U(X!,Y)	where	X!	is	a	private	good	and	Y	is	a	social	good	and	U! = U(X!,Y)	for	agent	B.	 If	Y	 is	a	partially	 social	good,	 then	 the	part	paid	by	A	might	not	affect	B	as	much	as	 it	benefits	 A.	 This	would	 be	 the	 case	 for	water	 treatment	 by	 two	 neighbors	 living	 along	 a	waterway.	 By	 splitting	 the	 respective	 part	 paid	 by	 the	 two	 agents,	 one	 can	 thus	 rewrite	Y = Y! + Y!	and	allow	variation	in	the	intensity	of	the	benefits	that	accrue	to	one	agent,	for	example	 by	 letting	 γ	 vary	 in	U! = U(X!,Y! + γY!)	 and	 likewise	 for	 agent	 B.	 The	 author	analyzes	all	the	seven	cases	and	summarizes	them	in	a	4x4	table	in	which	the	polar	case	of	pure	 private	 good	 lies	 in	 one	 corner	 and	 the	 pure	 social	 good	 in	 the	 other	 diagonally	opposing	corner.	
																																																								38	It	is	also	clear	from	Musgrave	(1969,	799).	
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When	 it	 became	 clearer	 that	 two	 independent	 criteria	 were	 at	 stake,	 one	 of	 the	points	of	contention	became	which	was	the	most	important	characteristic,	when	they	were	both	present.		As	Samuelson	argued	in	his	paper	presented	at	the	same	conference:		
This	may	 be	 a	 convenient	 place	 to	 note,	 for	 the	 interested	 reader,	 the	 few	 places	where	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 Musgrave	 leads	 to	 disagreement	 between	 us.	 The	possibility	 or	 impossibility	 to	 apply	 an	 ‘exclusion	 principle’	 is	 less	 crucial	 than	consumption	externality,	since	often	exclusion	would	be	wrong	where	possible.		Yet,	 Samuelson	 also	 acknowledged	 that	 “Many	 of	 my	 criticisms	 are	 met	 by	 the	reformulations	of	Musgrave	in	his	paper	for	this	conference	[1969a];	and	from	neighbourly	conversations	I	know	that	we	are	in	basic	agreement	on	most	issues”	(ibid).		
Musgrave’s	narrative	on	public	goods	takes	its	definite	textual	form	in	a	synthesis	of	the	discussion	he	published	in	1971.	What	is	new	in	this	paper	is	that	in	cases	where	“two	causes	of	market	failure	overlap,”	 like	in	lighthouses,	 	 the	more	basic	one	is	“the	nonrival	nature	 of	 consumption”,	 because	 “(in	 the	 efficient	 system)	 we	 would	 not	 wish	 to	 apply	exclusion	even	if	we	could	do	so	in	this	case”	(Musgrave	197,	307).39	In	sum,	at	the	end	of	the	 decade,	 Musgrave	 arrived	 at	 the	 conclusion	 that	 there	were	 potentially	 two	 distinct	causes	of	market	failure	in	social	goods,	but,	when	they	overlap,	he	agreed	with	Samuelson	that	non-rivalry	was	more	basic	than	non-exclusion.	This	last	point	is	important	if	we	look	at	Musgrave’s	 conceptual	work	on	 social	 goods	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 justify	public	 provision.	From	 this	perspective,	non-rivalry	 constitutes	 a	definitive	 argument	 for	public	provision.	Non-exclusion	explained	why	 individuals	would	 free	 ride,	but	 if	 exclusion	devices	 can	be	designed,	as	would	be	the	case	for	television,	the	argument	for	public	provision	would	fade	away.	 This	 contingency	 did	 not	 affect	 the	 non-rivalry	 dimension	 that,	 when	 seen	 as																																																									39	Musgrave	had	already	argued	in	1968	that	joint	consumption	was	the	‘most	basic’	case,	but	he	did	not	used	the	expression	of	non-rivalry.	
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decreasing	 cost,	 would	 not	 be	 tempered	 by	 new	 technological	 development.	 As	 long	 as	Pareto-efficiency	 was	 a	 goal	 of	 political	 representatives,	 free	 provision	 of	 social	 goods	would	be	called	for.	
Other	factors	might	have	played	a	role	in	Musgrave’s	conversion.	In	a	book	review	of	Musgrave’s	Theory,	 Buchanan	 (1960,	 237)	 already	 criticized	Musgrave’s	 reliance	 on	 this	criterion:	“the	impossibility	of	exclusion	is	not	a	necessary	condition	for	collective	action	in	satisfying	 a	 genuinely	 ‘social	want’.”	More	 generally,	 Buchanan’s	 (1965b)	 approach	 is	 to	minimize	 the	 importance	 of	 exclusion	 problems.	 If	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 real-word	 cases	exclusion	 is	not	 impossible,	 then	 some	 ‘joint’	 goods	 can	be	 efficiently	provided	by	 small-scale	clubs.	Recognizing	the	large-number	dilemma,	Buchanan’s	(1965a;	1968)	strategy	is	to	factor	down	interactions	to	small	groups	where	strategic	bargaining	can	lead	to	the	best	result,	 provided	 that	 appropriate	 constitutional	 rules	 can	 be	 established	 among	 the	parties.40	 Moreover,	 following	 the	 seminal	 contributions	 of	 Coase	 (1960)	 and	 Demsetz	(1964),	 many	 scholars	 tried	 to	 solve	 the	 problems	 of	 appropriability	 of	 services	 by	properly	 designing	 and	 assigning	 property	 rights.	 This	 research	 program	 might	 have	encouraged	Musgrave	to	adopt	another,	more	convincing,	argument	for	public	provision	of	social	goods,	although	there	is	no	direct	evidence	for	this	effect.	
																																																								40	 Marciano	 (2015)	 argues	 differently.	 He	 maintains	 that	 Buchanan	 recognized	 the	 necessity	 of	grounding	 individual	behavior	 in	ethics	to	guarantee	that	social	 interactions	always	result	 in	pro-social		behavior,	even	in	small	groups	
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3.2.	Public	Finance	in	Theory	and	Practice	Musgrave’s	definition	of	public	 goods	 formed	 the	basis	of	 a	 chapter	 in	an	undergraduate	textbook	 co-written	 with	 his	 wife	 and	 published	 in	 1973.41	 The	 terminology	 and	 the	arguments	 of	 the	 1971	 paper	 are	 reproduced	with	more	 examples	 of	 cases	 where	 both	causes	of	market	failure	overlap,	namely	air	purification,	national	defense,	and	street	lights	(Musgrave	and	Musgrave	1973,	54).	Then	the	authors	summarize	the	different	possibilities	in	a	2x2	table	(see	Table	1).	
	
Table	1:	Summary	Table	(source:	Musgrave	and	Musgrave	1973,	54)	In	 this	 table,	 case	 1	 represents	 the	 private-good	 case	where	 exclusion	 is	 possible	and	the	consumption	is	rival.	The	authors	then	explain	that:	
[i]n	all	other	cases,	market	failure	occurs	[…]	If	we	applied	the	term	‘social	good’	to	all	 situations	 of	 market	 failure,	 cases	 2,	 3	 and	 4	 would	 all	 be	 included.	 It	 is	customary,	however	to	reserve	the	term	for	case	3	and	4,	i.e.,	situations	of	nonrival	consumption.	(ibid.)		This	table	is	found	in	many	public	finance	and	introductory	microeconomics	texts	without	reference	 to	 its	 origin.	 The	 tables	 found	 in	 the	 textbooks	 surveyed	 display	 examples	 of	goods	rather	 than	numbers	 in	 the	cells.	The	 first	occurrence	of	 this	practice	appears	 in	a	
																																																								
41	The	778-page	book	was	re-edited	in	1976,	1980,	1984	and	1989.		
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chapter	by	Ostrom	and	Ostrom	(1977)	who	do	not	make	any	 reference	 to	Musgrave	and	Musgrave	(1973).	This	table	is	reproduced	in	the	Appendix	1.42	
The	objective	of	the	Musgraves’	table	is	to	give	a	first	approximation	of	what	ought	to	be	done	by	the	state,	and	at	the	same	time	introduce	students	to	some	of	the	issues	that	will	be	discussed	in	Public	finance	and	Public	economics.	It	helps	to	draw	the	line	between	a	sphere	of	individual	freedom	and	one	of	government	funding	and	regulation.	As	a	visual	representation	of	 the	 typology	of	goods,	 the	 table	carries	a	simple	narrative	 in	which	the	state	 is	 responsible	 for	 restoring	 efficiency.	 This	 focus	 on	 efficiency	 is	 implicit	 in	 the	discussion	 on	 public	 goods,	 and	 more	 generally	 in	 postwar	 theories	 of	 market	 failures	(Marciano	and	Medema	2015,	11).	Musgrave	also	acknowledged	(and	defended)	the	point	that	 governments	 could	 act	 from	 different	 values	 or	 principles,	 especially	 equity	 and	stability.	His	fiscal	federalism	framework	is	structured	on	this	broader	set	of	principles,	as	is	the	original	allocation	function	of	his	Theory,	which	also	included	the	provision	of	goods	to	satisfy	merit	wants.	Yet,	in	this	table	efficiency	is	still	the	only	objective	considered.	
The	table	is	also	representative	of	the	changes	of	practice	in	textbook	writing.	After	World	War	II,	economics	texts	gradually	contained	more	and	more	equations,	graphics	and	tables	(Solow	1997;	Giraud	2010).	In	this	sense,	the	Musgrave	textbook	is	very	modern	and	this	explains	its	popularity.	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	the	table	represents	a	typology	of	goods	characteristic	of	the	old	way	of	modeling	in	economics,	especially	in	the	German	tradition.																																																									42	Although	there	are	resemblances	to	the	Musgraves’	table,	the	narrative	which	is	attached	to	their	table	is	very	different.	The	Ostroms	objective	is	to	“explore	the	organizational	possibilities	for	the	public	sector,	 including	the	development	of	marketlike	arrangements.	Such	arrangements	suggest	an	 industry	 approach	 to	public	 services,	 an	 approach	with	 implications	 for	public	 administration	quite	different	from	management	and	control	through	an	overarching	public	bureaucracy.”	(Ostrom	and	Ostrom	1977,	164).	
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Still,	 a	 qualitative	 typology	 that	 produced	 a	 diversity	 of	 cases	 allowed	 for	 a	more	realistic	 view,	 and	 an	 easier	 fit	 with	 the	 complex	 real-life	 situations	 faced	 by	 the	 public	administrations	and	the	political	representatives,	than	a	“knife-edge	pole”	of	pure	collective	goods	proposed	by	Samuelson.	The	different	types	of	goods—including	merit	goods,	which	are	not	 included	 in	 the	 table—rationalize	 the	different	 types	of	 government	 intervention	(or	non-intervention	for	private	goods)	in	resource	allocation.	As	Musgrave	(1969a	p.	142)	put	it:	“semantics,	as	the	history	of	economic	thought	so	well	shows,	is	not	a	trivial	matter;	and	I	remain	persuaded	that	systematic	explanation	of	non-polar	situations	will	be	helpful,	as	 they	 may	 point	 to	 different	 policy	 solutions”.	 For	 him,	 the	 concept	 of	 social	 (public)	goods	was	one	element	within	a	comprehensive	theory	of	 the	public	sector.	To	be	useful,	Musgrave	 argued	 that	 the	 theory	had	 to	be	 realistic,	which	was	not	 a	decisive	 feature	of	Samuelson’s	model:	 “my	model	 of	 pure	 public	 goods	 has	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 an	 unrealistic	polar	 case”	 (Samuelson	 1958,	 336).	 In	 contrast	 with	 Musgrave’s	 realistic	 concern,	Samuelson	appears	as	the	romantic	figure.	He	was	contented	with	the	belief	that	his	model	“would	have	vital	policy	implications,’’	but	he	might	not	have	thought	it	his	responsibility	to	get	involved	in	the	details	and	derive	a	practical	theory	around	it.43	For	instance,	Hammond	(2015)	observes	that	Samuelson	did	not	discuss	the	theory	of	public	goods	in	at	 least	the	first	four	editions	of	his	Economics	(1958).	
																																																								43	 Samuelson’s	 occasional	 comments	 on	 the	 history	 of	 economic	 theory	 resolve	 around	praising	geniuses.	See	for	instance	the	introduction	to	the	second	edition	(1983)	of	his	Foundations	(1947),	or	his	apology	of	Frank	Ramsey	(as	discussed	by	Duarte	2010).	Moreover,	he	acknowledged	being	driven	by	aesthetic	ideals,	notably	in	his	contribution	on	collective	goods:	“My	aesthetic	sense	was	tickled	by	the	beautiful	duality	displayed	by	public	and	private	goods	and	their	“prices”—the	vertical	 addition	 of	 public-good	 “demands”	 as	 against	 the	 horizontal	 addition	 of	 private-good	“demands,”	the	“ +	and	=”	dualities.”	(“Public	Goods	Twenty	Years	Later,”	 June	1974,	PAS	papers,	Box	143.	p.	2)		
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Conclusion	Musgrave’s	 conceptualization	 of	 social	 goods	 evolved	 over	 the	 30-year	 period	 discussed	here.	 In	 his	 dissertation,	 Musgrave	 (1937)	 stumbled	 upon	 the	 problem	 of	 assessing	 the	individual	 benefits	 of	 social	 wants	 proper,	 which	 he	 singled	 out	 as	 being	 satisfied	 by	indivisible	 goods.	 This	 point	 was	 not	 so	 original,	 but,	 as	 public	 expenditures	 were	increasing,	 a	 better	 rationale	 for	 public	 provision	 had	 to	 be	 found.	 Because	 some	 goods	were	 non-excludable,	 the	 voluntary	 exchange	 assumption	 was	 unrealistic,	 and	 the	existence	of	a	state	with	coercive	power	had	to	be	assumed	at	the	outset.	Though	Musgrave	probably	did	not	need	this	argument	to	convince	himself	of	the	beneficial	role	of	the	state,	it	provided	what	would	become	a	 convincing	argument	 in	 the	 rational-choice	mindset	of	the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 century.	 In	 the	 1950s,	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 specificity	 of	 public	expenditures	 took	a	new	turn	with	 the	publication	of	Samuelson’s	paper.	 In	 the	10	years	that	followed,	Musgrave’s	conceptualization	of	social	goods	was	strongly	influenced	by	the	idea	of	 “joint	consumption	by	everyone,”	although	he	still	held	onto	non-exclusion	as	 the	cause	of	market	 failure.	During	 this	 time,	Samuelson	 tried	 to	convince	Musgrave	 that	 the	jointness	dimension	of	collective	goods	was	a	more	basic	cause	of	market	failure	in	the	face	of	 public	 goods.	 The	 definitive	 textbook	 definition	 of	 social	 or	 public	 good	 is	 given	 by	Musgrave	in	his	1966	paper	(published	in	1969).	Certainly,	models	in	public	economics	use	Samuelson’s	 mathematical	 definition	 (X = X!  ∀i),	 and	 the	 understanding	 of	 non-rivalry	owes	 a	 lot	 to	 Samuelson’s	discussion	on	 jointness	 in	 consumption.	 Still,	 it	was	Musgrave	who	 insisted	on	 the	 idea	of	 two	 independent	 criteria	 that	 lead	 to	a	more	 comprehensive	typology	of	goods.	Even	though	this	is	still	a	stylized	depiction,	it	is	more	realistic.	
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The	concept	of	public	good	(or	social	good)	is	thus	an	ideal	type	(Ver	Eecke	1999)	that	can	be	represented	in	a	table,	along	with	some	departures	from	it.	Since	it	is	an	ideal	concept,	it	is	not	to	be	directly	found	in	the	world.	When	trying	to	capture	real-world	public	services	with	Musgrave’s	typology,	some	concessions	must	be	made.	For	instance,	implicit	institutional	constraints	and	political	traditions	are	woven	into	every	bottom-up	fit.	More	generally,	 the	 market	 failure	 perspective	 in	 which	 this	 discussion	 took	 place	 can	 be	interpreted	 as	 a	 rationalization	 of	 contemporary	 concerns	 about	 the	 role	 of	 Federal	government	and	the	growth	of	the	welfare	state.	This	technical	debate	on	the	specificity	of	public	expenditures	highlights	the	evolution	of	public	finance	in	the	middle	of	the	twentieth	century.	 The	 story	 is	 about	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 scientific	 argument	 based	 on	 a	 specific	representation	of	the	agent	and	its	institutional	setting,	namely	a	selfish	rational	consumer	who	 demands	 some	 goods	 that	 have	 special	 technical	 characteristics.	 This	 sophisticated	argument	enjoyed	a	 certain	popularity	 in	 the	 intellectual	battle	 against	more	 libertarian-leaning	 economists,	 such	 as	 Buchanan,	 at	 least	 until	 the	 1970s	 when	 the	 “pendulum”	started	to	swing	back	to	more	unfavorable	views	toward	the	state.	Yet,	in	the	four	decades	of	his	life	that	followed	the	crystallization,	Musgrave	stayed	loyal	to	his	conception	of	social	goods.		
Over	the	70	years	of	his	career,	Musgrave	participated	in	the	institutionalization	of	modern	American	public	 finance.	One	of	 the	 striking	 features	of	Musgrave’s	 contribution	lies	 in	his	educational	reach.	As	Sturn	(2010,	307)	aptly	remarked:	“Musgrave’s	 influence	on	 modern	 Public	 Economics	 is	 an	 example	 of	 how	 the	 dissemination	 of	 innovations	 is	
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enhanced	by	a	suitable	expository	framework.”44	This	is	true	in	at	least	two	ways.	First,	it	is	true	directly,	through	teaching	public	finance	in	universities.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	three-branches	framework	within	which	social	goods	find	their	place	has	always	been	praised	as	a	useful	pedagogical	device	to	structure	the	discussion	on	market	failures	(R.	A.	Musgrave	1989;	Solow	in	Ott	et	al.	2008;	P.	Musgrave	2008).	Second,	Musgrave’s	normative	model	of	the	public	economy	proved	a	useful	representation	in	the	broader	economic	literacy	push	in	 the	 postwar	 era.45	 Musgrave	 wanted	 to	 contribute	 to	 a	 better	 society	 by	 designing	 a	normative	 model	 of	 the	 public	 economy	 that	 would	 help	 to	 elaborate	 rational	 public	policies	 and	 facilitate	 public	 debate	 on	 the	 role	 of	 government	 in	 society.	With	 growing	public	expenditures,	the	state	became	increasingly	important	in	the	lives	of	the	citizens.	In	this	 context,	 upholding	 democracy	 required	 that	 public	 policies	 be	 framed	 in	 clear	language,	to	which	Musgrave	contributed	with	his	definition	of	social	goods.	
		 	
																																																								44	Likewise,	Sinn	(2009,	131)	rightly	noted	that	Musgrave	“was	too	modest	when	he	claimed	that	he	just	transported	prior	knowledge	over	the	bridge	he	had	built	across	the	Atlantic.	His	writings	were	clearer	and	at	the	same	time,	more	comprehensive	than	those	of	his	predecessors.”	
45	 For	 example,	 it	 constituted	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 paper	 presented	 in	 JEC	 hearings	 on	 Federal	expenditures	 by	 the	 soon	 to	 be	 CEA	 president	 Walter	 Heller	 in	 1957.	 On	 the	 role	 of	 the	 1946	Employment	Act	and	its	offspring,	the	JEC	and	the	CEA,	see	Hansen	(1957,	81ff.)	See	also	Council	of	Economic	Advisers:	Walter	Heller,	Kermit	Gordon,	 James	Tobin,	Gardner	Ackley,	Paul	 Samuelson,	recorded	 interview	 by	 Joseph	 Pechman,	 August	 1,	 1964,	 John	 F.	 Kennedy	 Library	 Oral	 History	Program.	
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Appendix	1		
	Source:	Ostrom	and	Ostrom	(1977,	12)		 	
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